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INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS
Robert L. Felixt
I
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of interspousal immunity traditionally bars suits
between husband and wife for damages based on negligence. The ju-
dicial reluctance to interfere with the marital relationship and family
resources, however, is substantially unjustified in automobile accident
claims, where liability insurance compensation is usually the object of
the lawsuit. Most of the burden of automobile accident losses is today
distributed among insurance policyholders. This burden is considered
a necessary cost of operating an automobile, to be borne generally by
those who drive, rather than solely by the individual at fault in a
given instance. As the fault principle disappears, so should those doc-
trines that arose in response to it. In particular, interspousal immunity
is a remedial doctrine by which the general responsibility for one's
wrongful acts has been qualified by the principle that the courts will
not interfere with the marital relationship. Where the burden of a
judgment against the defendant spouse will be borne by an insurance
company, however, there is no significant threat to the marital rela-
tionship.
In a modern conflict-of-laws setting, changes in the treatment ac-
corded the interspousal immunity doctrine are especially likely.1 As
the choice-of-law process changes from selection among competing
jurisdictions to selection among competing laws, courts must more
closely analyze the policies and interests allegedly served by those laws.2
t Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1959,
University of Cincinnati; M.A. 1962, University of British Columbia.
1 For earlier treatments of the subject, see Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile
Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PITT.
L. REV. 397 (1954); Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital
Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. Cni. L. Rxv. 237 (1962). For recent treat-
ment, see Jayme, Interspousal Immunity, Revolution and Counterrevolution in American
Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307 (1967).
2 See D. CAvEns, Tim CHoicE-oF-LAw PRocEss (1965); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice
of Law Problem, 47 HAgv. L. Rav. 173 (1933), reprinted in COMM. ON SELECTED ARTcLas
ON CONFLICT OF LAiWs, ASS'N OF AM. LAw ScHooLs, SELECTED READINGS ON THE CONFLICr OF
LAws 101 (1956); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to
Cavers, 80 HAIv. L. Rav. 377 (1966).
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With certain exceptions, the appropriate result of such analysis is to
treat the presence of the marital status by referring to the law of a
concerned jurisdiction3 that does not allow that status to preclude
litigation arising from automobile accident injuries. Thus, in cases
where reference to a more liberal law can properly be made, the in-
hibiting function of the immunity doctrine can, and should, be limited
to purely local cases.
This solution is in part an extension of other views.4 In his effort
to develop broad choice-of-law principles in the field of torts, Pro-
fessor Cavers has already provided an interesting interplay between
territorial and domiciliary bases of reference.5 These principles allow
the choice-of-law process to assist the trend toward the compensation
of accident victims. It is significant that Professor Cavers expresses
dissatisfaction with his fifth principle where, for example, the marital
relationship "is used as a basis to avoid the full application of the
liability-creating law of the state of injury."6 He shuns a too partic-
ularized basis for escaping interspousal immunity.
If a base were sought for disregarding the immunity that did not
depend for its justification on the particulars of the case, it should
be found in the basis for the first principle I have proposed: a
preference for the law of the state which has established general
standards of conduct and of financial protection against the hazards
of life in that state....
Whether an exception to that broad principle should be ad-
mitted with respect to inter-spousal claims poses a question that
is hard to answer without taking into account the intrinsic merits
of the competing rules.7
Under this analysis, the choice-of-law method ceases to be an honest bro-
ker in the style of the first Restatement, which simply prescribed rules of
choice based upon accepted and unquestioned priorities of legislative ju-
risdiction.8 Rather, the choice-of-law method becomes a catalyst, acceler-
ating the reaction against unduly protective or inhibitive policies.
3 "By concerned jurisdictions are meant all the legally relevant communities that
have, in view of the elements in the multistate transaction relating it to various juris-
dictions, a concern with the particular issue or issues that have arisen." A. VON MEHREN
& . TRAuMAN, THE LAw or MuLTisrATE PROBLEMS: CASES ON CoNFia.r OF LAws 76 (1965).
In the foregoing passage the authors present a definition of "concerned jurisdiction," but
do not assert a choice in the context of any particular problem. See also id. at 102-33.
4 E.g., D. CAvERs, supra note 2, at 139-80, especially 177-80; Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNEL L.Q. 215 (1963).
5 D. CAvEns, supra note 2, at 139-80.
6 Id. at 177.
7 Id. at 179.
8 RsrTATEMENT or CoNm ar OF LAws (1934).
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Given the trend toward the distribution of loss, a resolution of the
"intrinsic merits of the competing rules" leads one away from the choice
of a law that provides interspousal immunity9 Professor Weintraub
has formulated a general choice-of-law rule that expresses no reservation
in favor of the domicile's interspousal immunity policy:
An actor is liable for his conduct if he is liable under the law of
any state whose interests would be advanced significantly by im-
posing liability, unless imposition of liability would unfairly sur-
prise the actor.10
Two recent New York cases involving suits by guest passengers
against the host drivers suggest a synthesis in favor of a law which dis-
tributes loss. In Macey v. Rozbicki,11 a guest passenger was injured in
Ontario, whose guest statute provided absolute immunity.12 The plain-
tiff, driver, and owner were all residents of New York. The plaintiff was
in Ontario for a week's visit at a summer home maintained there by the
other parties. The automobile involved was garaged and insured in New
York. The court, following the method of Babcock v. Jackson, 3 rejected
the application of Ontario's guest statute and held that the New York
standard of ordinary negligence should apply. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Keating observed that no interest of Ontario "has any relation
whatever to the New York policy of affording recovery to injured resi-
dents of this State ....,14
Kell v. Henderson 5 presented the converse of Babcock. An Ontario
passenger in an automobile driven by another Ontarian was seriously
injured in an accident in New York. The trial court denied defendant's
9 See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 238. "Thus a choice-of-law rule keyed to such a
trend will be focusing on a broad common policy as a basis for reconciling a conflict of two
narrow rules of law." Id.
10 Id. at 249.
11 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
12 ONTARiO REV. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960), as amended, Highway Traffic Amend-
ment Act c. 64, § 20(2) (1966).
13 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The court stated that
the Babcock rule, applied to a conflicts situation, gives controlling effect "to the law
of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence
or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in litigation."
18 N.Y.2d at 291, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592, quoting Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963). In Rozbicki, the
court held that since the parties were New Yorkers, the car licensed and insured in New
York, and the trip a temporary excursion into Canada, all the important "contacts" were
with New York, and therefore that state's law should apply. 18 N.Y.2d at 292, 221 N.E.2d at
381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
14 18 N.Y.2d at 294, 221 N.E.2d at 383, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
15 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), afl'd mem., 26 App. Div. 2d 595,
270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966).
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motion to plead the Ontario guest'statute as an affirmative defense; this
ruling was affirmed on appeal to the appellate division.16 Since the de-
cision was reached after Babcock, it cannot be justified as a mechanical
application of the lex loci rule. The law of New York controls not be-
cause New York is the place of injury but because its law asserts a policy
of compensation for persons injured on New York roads. If the decision
stands, a synthesis of Kell and Macey would produce at least a qualified
principle favoring the law of whichever concerned jurisdiction does not
provide immunity. In his discussion of the case, Professor Rosenberg
has suggested an alternative reference rule: "My proposed rule would
provide that the domicile of the automobile host determines the liabil-
ity he owes to a guest, unless the place of injury provides a higher stan-
dard.""'
A principle of alternative reference can be viewed as a masked pref-
erence for finding a law that will favor the plaintiff. A two-fold answer
can be made. First, state laws have been shifting toward allowing a dis-
tribution of those losses that are an inevitable aspect of life in a modern
industrial society.18 Second, there is a tendency in the conflict of laws to
select an appropriate law that protects "socially favored legal arrange-
ments"' 9 without damaging other properly protected interests. It is evi-
dent that the compensation of traffic victims is a socially favored ar-
rangement. Charitable immunity has fallen into disfavor, and guest
statutes have been narrowly construed in order to favor compensation of
victims.20 Interspousal immunity has long been under fire; supported by
the unanimous voice of legal scholarship,21 a trend away from this rela-
16 In approving the result, Professor Trautman draws upon a series of Canadian de-
cisions limiting the Ontario guest statute and upon the recent amendment of the statute
to admit recovery when gross negligence can be shown. The amendment was not applicable
to the facts of the case. Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 465 (1967); see ONTARIO
REv. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960), as amended, Highway Traffic Amendment Act c. 64, §
20(2) (1966) (proclaimed in force Jan. 1, 1967).
17 Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUm. L. REV.
459, 464 (1967).
18 See, e.g., Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automo-
bile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REv. 329, 344-45 (1964); Keeton, Creative Continuity in
the Law of Torts, 75 HIv. L. REv. 463, 475, 484-85, 493 (1962).
19 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 267,
284, 295-304 (1966). As regards the "revolution" in the choice-of-law process in the field of
torts, Professor Ehrenzweig has observed that "the alleged revolution ... is due primarily
to the malaise which pervades our domestic law, rather than to our dissatisfaction with the
conflicts law in this area." Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 378. See also id. at 383-84.
20 See W. PRossER, ToRTs § 127, at 1023-24 (3d ed. 1964) (retreat of charitable immunity
doctrine).
21 See id. § 115, at 879-85, and authorities cited therein, especially McCurdy, Personal
Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vm.L. I,. REv. 303 (1959), and McCurdy, Torts Between
1968)
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tional disability has slowly developed.22 If scholarly opinion is at all co-
gent, the trend must be viewed as enlightened.23 At least in the case of
automobile accidents for which insurance coverage is available, inter-
spousal immunity serves no useful societal function. It seems quite rea-
sonable that the choice-of-law process should serve to harmonize the
trend away from interspousal immunity.24
II
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A. The Doctrine in Traditional Form
1. The Fiction of Unity of Husband and Wife
The conceptual origin of interspousal immunity is the presently
unworkable fiction that husband and wife are one person -in the con-
templation of the law. 25 The consequence of this fiction can be looked
upon as substantive: a wife was deemed to have no cause of action
against her husband because he assumed title to all her choses in action.
The fiction also had a procedural impact: the law required the husband
to be joined in any suit involving the wife, and the anomaly of the
husband being both a plaintiff and a defendant in an interspousal suit
was rejected.
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1080 (1930). See also Sullivan, Intra-Family
Immunities and the Law of Torts in Ohio, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 447 (1967); Comment,
Interspousal Immunity-Time for a Reappraisal, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 550 (1966); Note, Inter-
spousal Immunity-A Policy-Oriented Approach, 21 RuTGERs L. REv. 491 (1967); Comment,
Tort Liability Between Husband and Wife: The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine, 21 U.
MrAiM L. REv. 423 (1966).
22 Professor Prosser lists 19 jurisdictions as part of this trend. See W. PRossER, supra
note 20, at 884-85.
28 See Hancock, supra note 1, at 240-43, 261-62, for a brief discussion of cases starting
the trend.
24 The societal function of each area of law in which a conflict arises, as well as
the locally conceived functions of the specific rules between which conflict exists,
ought to be tied into the choice-of-law process.
Leflar, supra note 19, at 282.
25 By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very be-
ing or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband ....
I BLACSTONE, COMmENTARIUS 442 (2d ed. 1766); see 2 id. at 433.
The immunity of one spouse from suit by the other and the corresponding disability
of the latter to sue the former illustrates in our law:
[A] tendency to affix duties and liabilities independently of the will of those
bound, to look to relations rather than to legal transactions as the basis of legal
consequences, and to impose both liabilities and disabilities upon those standing
in certain relations as members of a class rather than upon individuals.
R. POUND, THE SPmrr OF TBE COMMON -LAw 14 (1921).
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[N]either spouse could maintain an action against the other for
either a personal or a property tort, whether it was committed
before or during marriage, and the action was not maintainable
even after divorce .... 26
Although the common-law fiction of unity of husband and wife has been
discarded, the doctrine of interspousal immunity for personal torts re-
mains the majority view. 27
2. Present Justifications-Pro and Con
Many judicial opinions have asserted that suits between spouses
are disruptive of the family harmony that law and society ought to
foster. Compensation through insurance, however, probably causes less
division than leaving the injury uncompensated. Further, maintaining
immunity from suit for personal injury inflicted negligently is incon-
sistent with allowing suits for intentional torts or for injury to the
wife's property. Of course, in the case of intentional torts there is little
family harmony left to protect. Property disputes, however, are at least
as productive of discord as nominal disputes in which compensation
from insurance works to the advantage of both spouses. 28 To view
otherwise the typical automobile accident claim (for insurance com-
pensation) is to take a false view of the need to preserve the family
exchequer. The law should not be blind to the husband's contractual
provision for the victims of his negligent operation of an automobile.
To exempt from the protection of this arrangement the person most
dependent on the insured is to view the resources available for redress
in a static rather than a dynamic way.29
The family has been looked upon as a quasi-governmental system
of order within society. It is left free to administer many rules of con-
duct in a manner consistent with the peculiar demands of its own na-
ture and organization. Yet, intrafamily relations are not exempt from
28 W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 880.
Thus in many situations it is impossible to decide whether at common law the
determinative factor is one of substance or of procedure. Often one incident of
marriage is explained by referring to another, whereas they are both based on
some common reason.
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAav. L. REv. 1030, 1034 (1930).
27 The Majority Rule is that one spouse cannot sue the other for personal injury
where (1) the tort occurred during marriage (2) they are both ... married to each
other and (3) the injury was due to negligence and was not intentional.
Hume, Intra-Familial Immunity to Suit, 17 FEDERATION Or INS. COUNSEL J., Fall 1966, at 45.
For a convenient collection of cases representing variations of the majority and minority
views, see id. at 50-57.
28 See McCurdy, supra note 26, at 1052-53.
29 Cf. H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEssas: BASIC PROBLEmS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAw 111-16 (tent. ed. 1958).
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society's control. The legal system polices many family activities today,
and modern social and economic realities and ideals are not consistent
with the theory that the wife's inability to recover is justified by the
need to maintain the authority of the paterfamilias.30
Some may claim that other existing remedies justify the preserva-
tion of interspousal immunity; but these are particularly irrelevant to
automobile accident cases. Divorce and separation, for example, may be
adequate remedies when tortious or criminal conduct justifies judicial
involvement with the domestic unit, but inflicting injury by negligent
operation of a motor vehicle is not yet a ground for either. Although
most traffic accidents involve some violation of traffic rules and may
thereby occasion criminal sanctions, the offended spouse's interest in fi-
nancial compensation for injury is not vindicated by the husband's pay-
ing a fine or serving a term in the workhouse.
The courts preserve interspousal immunity also because they do
not wish to be converted into supra-family councils. They feel that they
should be protected from disputes that offend their decorum and allow
spouses to shed the responsibility of good faith conciliation that is an in-
cident of their status. But automobile accident claims, especially when
compensation is sought from insurance coverage, should not be treated
as legally irrelevant family squabbles. The recognition of such claims
would serve to stabilize family finances and perhaps even to restore fam-
ily harmony. In states that permit such claims, there is apparently no
greater disruption of family harmony, and no greater flood of litigation,
than in other states.31
The courts are also reluctant to make any change that may seem to
require a competence residing more appropriately in the legislature.32
30 Historically it is most likely that the explanation of no cause of action for per-
sonal injuries is to be found [in the doctrine that the head of the family is clothed
with broad authority and enjoys a sort of "sovereign immunity"] ... , both in the
husband and wife and in the parent and child cases. It is, however, an obsolete
conception.
McCurdy, supra note 26, at 1076.
31 Id. at 1053.
32 "[T]his long-established immunity is based upon significant considerations of pub-
lic policy, questions concerning which are peculiarly suited to legislative resolution." Ho-
vanetz v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn. 1967). Hovanetz involved a plaintiff who
was injured when an automobile operated by defendant in which she was a passenger
struck a parked vehicle. Plaintiff and defendant were married after the action was- com-
menced. The court likened its task, quite erroneously, to a judicial abrogation of govern-
mental immunity. In deferring to legislative inactivity the court, however, conceded:
We recognize that for the past 50 years this common-law doctrine of marital
immunity has been under attack and that many of the reasons advanced for contin-
ued judicial adherence are out of tune with the realities of life about us, especially
as to torts arising out of the operation of motor vehicles.. . . The growing number
[Vol. 53:406
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But most states have passed married women's acts which do not make
clear whether one spouse may assert a claim against the other for negli-
gently inflicted personal injuries.33 Since these statutes apparently leave
the matter for judicial interpretation, the claimed deference to legisla-
tive judgment becomes a refusal to perform the delegated task of in-
terpretation.3 The inconsistent interpretations given the same or simi-
lar statutory language by the various state courts show that the judiciary
often is the branch unconvinced of the propriety of interspousal litiga-
tion. 5 Yet, a moribund doctrine of judicial origin should not be
allowed to stand merely because a legislature has imperfectly or inarticu-
lately abrogated it.-6 Apart from the few jurisdictions that have ex-
pressly authorized such suits3 7 or those that have expressly proscribed
them,38 most have statutes that allow more flexibility of interpretation
than the courts have exercised.
Yet, interspousal immunity does protect the adversary process from
the possibility of having merely nominal opponents. The closeness of
the parties and their freedom from outside observation enhances the op-
portunity for collusive misrepresentation of the facts. If fear of collusion
is the primary reason for continuing interspousal immunity, however,
the courts have raised a presumption of collusion that is manifestly un-
fair. If collusion exists in a particular case, it should be demonstrated to
the forum. Even where the potential for collusion is greater because of
of decisions in jurisdictions permitting direct suits by the spouse are based either
upon express statutory authority or, in large part, upon a liberal construction of
their married women's acts.
148 N.W.2d at 565-66.
33 McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VmL. L. REv. 303, 310-22
(1959). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.01 (1945):
Women shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality after mar-
riage as before and every married woman shall receive the same protection of all
her rights as a woman which her husband does as a man, including the right to
appeal to the courts in her own name alone for protection or redress ....
34 E.g., Hovanetz v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1967).
35 See McCurdy, supra note 26, at 1050-54.
36 Courts have been slow to reverse prior constructions in order to abrogate the doc-
trine. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Brown
v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343
(1965).
37 E.g., N.Y. GEN., OBLIGATIONS LAw § 3-313 (McKinney 1964). Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 246.07,
246.075 (1957) has similar provisions. But -see N.Y. INS. LAw § 167(3) (McKinney 1963),
which changes the liability insurance laws to provide that no policy "shall be deemed to
insure against any liability of an insured because of death or injuries to his or her spouse
... unless express provision... is included in the policy."
38 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959), establishing interspousal immu-
nity shortly after it was judicially abrogated in Brandt v. Keller, 413 IlL. 503, 109 N.E.2d
729 (1952).
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the nature of a suit, the cure should not be to bar the suit, but to de-
velop procedural safeguards that will enable the forum to view the mat-
ter properly on its merits.89
This article will not discuss in any detail the developing enterprise-
risk theory, which is replacing fault as a basis for allocating losses.40 As
enterprise risk becomes the dominant factor, however, judicial fear of
collusion between spouses should diminish; for without the issue of
fault, there will be less temptation for collusion on the primary issue of
liability.
B. An Analysis of Interspousal Immunity
The law of torts is concerned with related but distinguishable as-
pects of the automobile accident: the conduct of the one sought to be
held liable, and the compensation which is sought for the resulting in-
jury. Interspousal immunity is concerned with whether the injury is
compensable. The marriage relation has nothing to do with whether the
defendant spouse has been negligent or whether his negligence has
caused an injury. In other words, interspousal immunity is not relevant
to an inquiry concerning primary rights and duties. The issue is not
whether a standard of conduct has been violated, but whether a remedy
may be pursued in the courts. 41 By the application of interspousal im-
munity, the injured wife is excluded from the class of persons who have
recourse against the husband for injuries caused by his tortious opera-
tion of an automobile.42
Insurance companies, of course, have an immediate interest in
89 See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 INS. L.J. 411; Leigh, Direct Ac-
tions Against Liability Insurers, 1949 INS. L.J. 633. See also Ford, supra note 1, at 400;
Streit, The Carrying of Liability Insurance as Creating Tort Liability, 1952 INS. L.J. 602. It
has been suggested, for example, that the insurance company, in cases where it is repre-
sented, should be permitted to treat the defendant husband as a hostile witness. "The few
states that have permitted this procedure have apparently found the law of evidence ade-
quate to deal with the problem of collusion in a manner that gives maximum protection to
all concerned." Ford, supra note 1, at 423.
40 See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965). For a suggested reordering of the treatment of automo-
bile accident injury claims, see R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNua_, BAsic PROTErcON FOR THE
TRArrxc VIcTim (1965).
41 It is otherwise where one person is required to exercise, by reason of his office or
profession, a greater degree of skill than that to which ordinary persons are held. Even so,
it may be argued that most of tort law is concerned with a preliminary inquiry whether a
standard of conduct has been violated, and then with whether it is in the public interest
to compensate particular groups of individuals within the general class of injured persons.
To this extent, the criminal law is primarily admonitory and tort law is only indirectly so.
See H. HART & A. SACKs, supra note 29, at 136-38, 141-47, 153-55.
42 Although the converse is also generally true, most cases involve suits by the wife.
[Vol. 53:406
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knowing the class of claimants who may be compensated in accordance
with general or specific liability insurance provisions. As tort law moves
away from fault liability and towards loss distribution, insurance com-
panies are sure to be affected. But to the extent that they are engaged in
a private enterprise based on consensual arrangements, they are able in
large measure to plan accordingly. To be sure, the legal consequences of
primary activity may shift from time to time in keeping with the ob-
served trend; but with the exception of an unreasonable surprise or an
especially radical innovation, insurance companies can claim no legally
protected interest to be insulated from shifts in the treatment of acci-
dent losses. Since the terms of insurance policies are largely dictated by
the insurer,43 existing liabilities can be expressed as within or without
the terms of insurance contracts. A shift away from interspousal immu-
nity would not raise the issue of what conduct creates liability.44 Even
so, legislation in some states has protected the insurer by providing that
it can be liable on interspousal claims only if the contract expressly cov-
ers such claims.45 Accordingly, the insurer can protect itself from the
peculiar disadvantages occasioned by interspousal litigation. The insur-
ance company may be despoiled by baseless claims, but it usually has
the right to defend on behalf of the insured against the action by the
spouse. In the long run, interspousal automobile accidents probably
will not have any significant impact upon the actuarial practices of in-
surance companies.46
Cases involving suits by the wife against persons connected with
the husband generally support the foregoing analysis. 47 In Schubert v.
Schubert Wagon Co.,48 the court sustained a suit by a wife against her
43 Sometimes, however, the insurance company cannot dictate the manner in which
the funds may be sought. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 848 U.S. 66 (1954).
In Watson a Louisiana statute which allowed persons injured in Louisiana to proceed di-
rectly against the insurance company of the tortfeasor was held constitutional, even when
applied to a policy made in another state which recognized the binding effect of provisions
in insurance contracts denying such direct actions. The Court held that Louisiana could
thus protect the interests of persons injured there.
44 Cf. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 234-40. See also H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 29,
at 485.
45 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.J. 1957); statutes cited note
87 supra; cf. Bradford v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
46 Cf. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MicH. L.
REv. 689 (1960) (no change in insurance premiums after a change from contributory to
comparative negligence rule). See also Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Pro-
cess-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes
in the Confllict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable
and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 794, 978 (1960).
47 Cf. F. HARPER & F. JAm, TORTS § 8.10, at 646-47 (1956).
48 249 N.Y. 258, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
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husband's employer after she had been injured by her husband's negli-
gence. The court rejected the argument that, since a suit by the wife
against the husband would have failed, the employer should not be held
liable. Chief Judge Cardozo observed:
We find no collision between the principle of liability established
in this case and the principle of exemption established in actions
against a husband. If such a collision, however, could be found
with the result that one or other principle must yield . . . the
exemption would have to give way as an exception, more or less
anomalous, to a responsibility which today must be accepted as
the general rule .... By authority and tradition, an exception has
been engrafted upon this rule where the husband is defendant.
We are not at liberty to extend it by dubious construction.4 9
Whether based upon a social policy of enterprise risk or an analysis of
derivative liability, the result is sound. The employer is a stranger to
the husband-wife relationship; suit against him should not be barred by
an immunity that protects other interests.
Baker v. Gaffney50 illustrates the confusion that results from failure
to treat interspousal immunity as a doctrine of remedial rights and du-
ties. The wife sued her husband and the owner of the auto he negli-
gently operated. The spouses were domiciled in the District of Colum-
bia, which bars suits between spouses for negligently inflicted personal
injuries. The accident occurred in New York, which allows such suits. 51
Both jurisdictions have financial responsibility acts, which make the
owner of an automobile responsible for injury caused by a borrower's
negligent driving.52 The suit against the husband was dismissed by the
District of Columbia court because the parties had been married after
the accident.53 The court determined that the owner, "who as a Good
Samaritan" had loaned his car to the husband, should not be held liable
to the latter's wife. It asserted that, since there was no judicial ma-
49 Id. at 258, 164 N.E. at 43. The argument may be made that, since the employer has,
at any rate, a right over against the husband, the wife in reality recovers from the hus-
band. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 47, § 8.10, at 646-47. This argument, however, ig-
nores the economic reality that the employer would probably gain little from such a suit
and that the real stake-holder is the insurance company. The French method is to allow
recovery against the employer under C. Cxv. art. 1384 without proof of fault while restrict-
ing recovery against the employer to art. 1382, where fault must be established. See cases
collected in A. voN MEREN, THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEAt 404-10 (1957).
50 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956).
51 See note 37 supra.
52 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-417 to 40-498 (1961); N.Y. Vas. & TERA. LAw §§ 330-68 (Mc-
Kinney 1960).
53 In the District of Columbia interspousal immunity was a bar even to suits based on
antenuptial torts. Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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chinery to entertain a suit by the wife against the husband, the finan-
cial responsibility act should not be enlarged by questionable interpre-
tation to allow the wife to sue the owner. 54 Further, the lex loci could
not be used, because of this "mechanical" lack.55 The result may be ac-
cepted as an expression of remedial policy, but basing the decision on
procedural inadequacy is functionally inappropriate. The difficulty of
handling potentially collusive litigation raises procedural problems,
but the rationale of this case in terms of procedure really derives from
implementation of the remedial policies of the law.56
III
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws
A. Concerns, Policies, and Interests
To secure the safety of persons and property, all states have estab-
lished a general responsibility to compensate those injured by another's
negligent conduct. This remedial obligation operates directly to allow
compensation to an injured person, and indirectly to deter negligent
conduct. As in many other particulars, however, the states do not agree
whether this general responsibility may be enforced against one's
spouse. In a conflicts setting the issue of remedy may involve the inter-
ests of three states; an accommodation must be sought among the poli-
54 141 F. Supp. at 604. The point was novel in the District of Columbia but since the
District inherited Maryland common law, the court followed the case of Riegger v. Bruton
Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940). There a wife sought recovery against her hus-
band's employer. The suit was barred on the grounds that the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior was inapplicable where the one primarily negligent was free of liability.
55 Had there been a sufficient "judicial machinery," lex loci would have been appli-
cable. See Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
56 In Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia refused to apply the District's interspousal immunity
rule, applying instead the law of North Carolina, the place of the accident. The husband
died after suit was instituted and the court determined that, therefore, the basis of the doc-
trine disappeared and the wife should be permitted to maintain the suit against the hus-
band's estate.
No longer was there in existence a predicate for the assertion of a policy which
would bar the continued maintenance of an action designed to vindicate the right
which had . . accrued to the wife. Balancing the respective interests in such
circumstances with the permissible flexibility open to us ... we may apply the
law of North Carolina.
Id. at 99. Thus, the court assimilated the position of the wife to that of persons generally
benefited by the policy of its own survival statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (Supp. V, 1966),
shared by that of North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-175 (1966). The court relied on
the flexible approach of Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1965). For recent approval of this approach, see Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1967).
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cies and interests of the place where the accident happened, the place of
domicile of the spouses, and the place where the remedial claim is put
forth, i.e., the forum.
The state where the accident occurred has an interest in regulating
the conduct of persons within its borders. Further, the expenses of treat-
ment given the injured person often are incurred where the accident
took place; the credit arrangements made to cover these expenses give
rise to a state's interest in protecting creditors by assuring that the vic-
tim is compensated.
The state of domicile is the one most concerned with the well-
being of the spouses and protection of the marital relationships, and it
is upon this that it bases its claim to primary interest in the outcome of
the conflicts situation.57 Often the credit arrangements arising from
treatment are made in the domicile; 68 and, in any event, many eco-
nomic consequences, such as inability to work, are most evident there.
The forum state has an interest in maintaining the dignity of its
courts by not allowing collusive claims. As discussed above, however, it
is unfair to presume an undemonstrated collusion between spouses.
Thus, the propriety of a forum state asserting its own remedial policies
raises delicate considerations. 9
Moreover, there may be a multistate interest in having the accom-
modation among interested states made in a manner consistent with the
concerns of a federal system. As the trend toward the distribution of
losses continues, doctrines that concentrate losses are being limited. It
seems an appropriate function of the choice-of-law process to accelerate
the trend by localization of the interspousal immunity doctrine.
57 Although "domicile," in its technical sense, will probably continue to be used as a
choice-of-law reference for interspousal immunity matters, "home" or "settled residence"
has been suggested as a more rational index. See D. CAvEns, supra note 2, at 140, 155, 182.
58 Our territorial allocation of jurisdiction necessarily requires that the interests and
policies invoked be those of the states concerned. An accounting of the economic interests
of the creditors involved might be made without reference to state lines. For example, a
person injured near a state line might be taken from the place of injury to a hospital in a
bordering state that is not the domicile. Creditors affected by this transaction may reside
or do business in both, or all three, states. However, the administrative difficulty of reck-
oning the apportionment of creditor interests in such a case and the facility of doing sub-
stantial justice to creditors by the sharing among the states of a general policy of protect-
ing creditor interests make such complications undesirable and unnecessary in the long
run. In any event, concern for creditor interests is ancillary to the disposition of the con-
troversy between the parties to the transaction, and the well-being of creditors is necessar-
ily incidental to the immediate problem. It is obvious, however, that, whereas nonimmu-
nity works to the benefit of inevitable creditor claims, an immunity policy may work to
their detriment.
59 See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & Cote TEM. PROB. 754 (1963).
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1. False Conflicts Exposed
If the domicile state is the forum and it allows suit between spouses,
its policy should control over an immunity policy of the place of the
wrong. The latter's interest in immunity is at best slight, since the par-
ties are foreign spouses. This situation represents a false conflict, 60 and
only the domicile's policy allowing suit is appropriately invoked. Also,
allowing the suit gives incidental benefit to creditors at the place of
injury.
When the forum is also the place of injury the disposition of inter-
ests is much the same: this situation presents a false conflict. Although it
may be argued that the combination of the interests of the locus and the
forum qua forum does not make it unreasonable to apply the immu-
nity doctrine, the interests supporting such policies are outweighed by
those of the state of domicile. The judicial facilities may be claimed in-
capable of handling the peculiar problems of interspousal litigation, but
most likely this would merely be a mask for assertion of the immunity
policy.61
A disinterested state before whose courts the parties appear has no
connection with the parties or the transaction to support the applica-
tion of its own dispositive rules. It can, however, select appropriate
rules from the laws of the concerned jurisdictions, according to its
choice-of-law method. The disinterested forum has the advantage of se-
lecting an appropriate dispositive rule without being constricted by the
doctrines of its local decisional law. On the other hand, it has the disad-
vantage of not being able to modify the rule of the jurisdiction to which
its choice-of-law method may refer. It may also be disinclined to modify
its choice-of-law method in a matter not involving its own dispositive
rules. Nevertheless, the interests of the domicile still outweigh those of
the locus, and the defense of immunity should be rejected. If the forum
also has a policy of nonimmunity there is no difficulty presented by its
advancing the policy of the domicile; certainly it should have no institu-
tional inhibitions. If the forum has a policy of immunity there may be
some difficulty, though the conflict is still false. The difficulty is dis-
pelled if the forum's choice-of-law solution points to the law of the do-
micile. But when its conflicts rule points to the law of the place of in-
jury, its lack of concern with the case may militate against abandoning
its choice-of-law rule, even for the sake of enlightenment. A change,
however, is preferable to assertion of the irrelevant policy of the place of
60 Hancock, supra note 1. See generally Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CAsuF. L. REv.
74 (1967).
61 See, e.g., Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956), discussed at p. 416 supra.
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injury. Where consistent with justice, the case ought otherwise to be
dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.62
2. The True Conflict Resolved
Where a state prohibits suits between its domiciled spouses,
and the state in which injury occurs has a policy of nonimmunity,
a true conflict emerges. The general applicability of the remedial
policy of the locus is challenged by the special exemption policy of
the domicile. Where the forum is also the domicile and the mat-
ter is viewed as a problem of accommodating the competing inter-
ests of the domicile and the place of injury, a resolution in favor of
the law of the domicile seems sensible, especially where the choice-
of-law rule of the place of injury would point to the law of the domi-
cile.63 If, however, the choice-of-law rule of the place of injury would
point to the lex loci, the forum faces an assertion of that other state's
policy in cases involving spouses of the forum state. This total law refer-
ence should not be adopted as a mere mechanism to escape the domi-
cile's immunity. Attention to the manner in which the place of injury
treats out-of-state spouses, however, may lead the forum to consider
whether its interest requires the assertion of the immunity policy in the
case of a claim based on an out-of-state injury. If a "restrained and mod-
erate" interpretation of the forum's law is appropriate for the purpose
of mitigating or avoiding potential conflicts, 64 a similar interpretation is
appropriate here to favor an accommodation that reflects the trend to-
ward the distribution of risk and loss. 65 While the forum's interest in its
62 For a consideration of whether a state is obligated constitutionally to provide a
forum for cases of this type, see Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of
Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLicr OF LAWS 283 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED ESSAYS]. See also Currie, supra note
59, at 767.
63 See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N. W.2d 814 (1959).
In Haumschild, the situation was reversed; the formal domicile state (Wisconsin) had a
nonimmunity doctrine and the state where the accident occurred (California) recognized
interspousal immunity. The reach of California law was tangentially considered, because
if California had been the forum state its choice-of-law rule would have pointed to the
law of the domicile. Although it was rejected as the basis of decision, attention to the pos-
sibilities of renvoi may be conducive to a functional analysis. See von Mehren, The Renvoi
and its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXT CENTURY
COMPAATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw 380 (K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren & J. Hazard eds.
1961).
64 See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See
Currie, in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1242 (1963); Currie, supra note 59, at 768; cf. Cavers, Oral Con-
tracts to Provide by Will and the Choice-of-Law Process, in PERSPECTIVES oF LAw: ESSAYS
FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 38, 48-53 (R. Pound, E. Griswold, & A. Sutherland eds. 1964).
65 See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 215, 238-39.
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own domiciliaries is dominant, it is not necessarily exclusive. To avoid
asserting an archaic common law immunity, the domicile forum might
retain the doctrine only in wholly domestic cases. In conflicts cases that
involve the interests of a nonimmunity policy of the place of injury, the
domicile forum could adopt a choice-of-law principle that points to the
law of whichever concerned state's policy of compensation can reason-
ably be furthered. Thus, in Professor Cavers's terms it could adopt a
principle that expresses "a preference for the law of the state which has
established general standards of conduct and of financial protection
against the hazards of life in that state." 66 As the choice-of-law process in-
creasingly focuses on the bases of conflicting policies, the resolutions of
conflicts problems will more likely reflect a reasoned preference for the
sounder policy.67
A possible exception to the principle of alternative reference occurs
where the immunity policy of the domicile is expressly provided by stat-
ute. As the primary instrument of that policy, the domiciliary forum
may find its application unavoidable. Even so, there are mitigating fac-
tors. Typically, such statutes make no provisions for choice of law. Al-
though they are clearly intended to apply to domiciliaries of the state,
they express no more policy grounds than have been urged to support
immunity as a common law doctrine. As such they are merely declara-
tory of the common law. Nevertheless, when the legislature has clearly
spoken, judicial deference probably requires a court to apply the immu-
nity to its domiciliaries, even when the injury occurred in another
state.6 8
When the forum is at the place of injury, the principle of alterna-
tive reference is more easily asserted. The forum presumably can handle
the peculiar problems of interspousal suits, and it may act as the judicial
agent of its own policy. Courts that have reached this result, however,
have done so on the basis of the lex loci rule as a mechanical formula, or
60 D. CAvEas, supra note 2, at 179. Professor Cavers warns, however, that "the finan-
cial hazard of the state of injury may seem too erratic or too narrow a basis for applying
its law." Id. at 178-79. Nevertheless, "the difference in the loss experience in the domicili-
ary state owing to the adoption of one rule as against the other would almost certainly
never show up in that state's liability insurance rates." Id. at 179-80. See also Peck, supra
note 46, at 727-28.
67 See Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in
Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967). See also Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966).
68 For the suggestion that courts in cases of this type may not avoid the application of
local statutes, see Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 679 (1968). "The court must follow the dictates of its own legislature, provided these
dictates are constitutional." Id. at 682 (emphasis omitted).
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have emphasized the merely procedural aspect of capacity to sue or be
sued, which is a result of, rather than a basis for, a policy of interspousal
immunity. Some have even ignored the conflicts issue involved.
In Alberts v. Alberts,69 a Massachusetts couple were involved in an
automobile accident in North Carolina. Massachusetts has an immunity
policy, whereas North Carolina, where suit was brought, does not. Ob-
serving that its Married Women's Act contains no express provision of
limitation to resident spouses, the court concluded that "although plain-
tiff is a nonresident and the action transitory, the doors of the courts of
this state are open to her to determine her rights."70 Nevertheless, me-
chanical adherence to the lex loci rule compelled the result in the case,
for the procedural classification alone is inadequate.71
When the choice-of-law rule of the domicile points to the lex loci,
it is then reasonable to conclude that the domicile has adopted a restric-
tive application of its immunity policy. In such a case the forum should
apply the nonimmunity policy; to change its own choice-of-law rule in
the face of the domicile's unwillingness to extend its own immunity pol-
icy would be inappropriate. Yet, in spite of functional overtones, these
are just mechanical evaluations; the application of the nonimmunity
policy would more easily rest upon a preference for a policy of loss-dis-
69 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940).
70 Id. at 444, 8 S.E.2d at 524. In Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941),
a case involving the same law-fact pattern, the court observed that "such a limitation
might import some constitutional difficulty." Id. at 54, 12 SE.2d at 651 (concurring opin-
ion). This seems unduly solicitous of the privileges and immunities clause of the United
States Constitution (art. IV, § 2). Unless the doctrine of interspousal immunity is treated
merely as a rule of procedure or court administration, a classification for choice-of-law
purposes based on the domicile of the parties does not seem unreasonable under the Con-
stitution. See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960), reprinted in SeCran EssAys 445.
When the privileges-and-immunities clause requires that a citizen of another state
be permitted access to the courts of the forum, however, there is no necessary im-
plication regarding the law to be applied; whether the state must also extend to
him the benefit of its laws is a separate question.
Id. at 1351, SEarrr EssAYs at 477. Perhaps the North Carolina court was asserting that
the lex fori controlled both procedure and substance-procedure expressly and substance
implicitly by reason of the lex loci rule.
71 In Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), the law-fact pattern was the
converse of that in Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940), and the court ap-
plied the immunity policy of the place of injury (Virginia) in a case involving its own do-
miciliaries. On the other hand, application of the immunity policy of the domicile in a
case like Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), discussed in note 70 supra, may
be undesirable in Professor Currie's view, for "to deny recovery would mean that the
North Carolina people who furnish ... services would be denied an important source of
compensation, perhaps the only adequate source." Currie, in Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. 1212, 1237 (1963).
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tribution in accordance with the more liberal policy of the place of in-
jury.
The disinterested forum is a stranger to a case involving a true con-
flict. The court is faced with a dilemma: whether to be an unnecessary
instrument of the inhibitive policy of the domicile or an instrument of
the compensatory policy of the locus. In the latter case, the court, in the
guise of enlightenment, would be making a "disinterested" choice of a
policy that arguably is supported by the lesser of the two competing in-
terests. Yet, no interest of the forum is disadvantaged by the selection of
the nonimmunity policy of the place of injury. In situations like this,
Professor Currie would abandon rules for choice-of-law and allow the
disinterested forum to ask itself what interest Congress would subordi-
nate if it were to consider the conflict from the viewpoint of the na-
tional interest.72 Although Congress is unlikely to venture into the reso-
lution of this problem, federal legislation in the field of torts has not
been hospitable to common law doctrines that provide immunity or
tend to concentrate risk and loss.73 The interstate policies in favor of the
free movement of persons, property, and credit across state lines suggest
a choice of law in favor of compensation, especially in view of the trend
away from immunity in a number of states.
3. Nonconflict Cases
When the domicile and the locus both have nonimmunity
policies, there is no conflict. Unless there is some procedural in-
ability to handle interspousal litigation, the disinterested forum's
policy is not invoked and the nonimmunity policy should be ap-
plied. Nor is there any conflict when both the domicile and the locus
have immunity policies; but in such cases the disinterested forum has no
opportunity to invoke the principle of alternative reference. The court
is not in a position to make use of its own policy of nonimmunity.7 4 Of
course, a dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens, if possible,
is preferable to a dismissal with prejudice by a forum necessarily reluc-
72 Currie, supra note 59, at 778, 785. This would involve "candid free choice between
the competing policies and interests, amounting to the exercise of legislative discretion
.... " Id. at 785.
73 E.g., Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 US.C. §§ 51-60 (1964), abolishes the de-
fenses embodied in the fellow-servant rule and defenses of contributory negligence and
the assumption of risk. A standard of comparative negligence is established for the pur-
pose of mitigating damages in proportion to the employee's negligence.
74 The disinterested forum's application of its own nonimmunity policy when con-
trary to the law of both concerned jurisdictions would likely be "unwarranted and uncon-
stitutional." Currie, supra note 59, at 780. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 US. 897 (1930).
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tant to anticipate a modification or abandonment of interspousal immu-
nity by the domicile or the locus.
B. The First Restatement and the Lex Loci Rule
One of the advertised aims of conflict-of-laws rules is that the choice
of forum should not determine the disposition of the claim35 At first
impression, there are two ways to accomplish such uniformity. If each
state had the same internal law, then conflicts law would be superflu-
ous.7 6 But such an identity is unlikely to develop in our federal system. 7
Alternatively, if all jurisdictions employed the same conflicts rules, only
one jurisdiction's law would be selected for the disposition of a particu-
lar issue.78 This solution was the doctrinaire aim of the first Restate-
ment79 and the vested rights theory it promulgated. 0 This proffered cer-
tainty was and is illusory.81
To determine what law should apply in a torts case, the Restate-
ment prescribed that "the law of the place of the wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal injury."8 2 With respect to inter-
spousal immunity, prevailing case authority was equally doctrinaire:
"that no cause of action arises in favor of either husband or wife for a
75 Of course, there are other aims that occasionally overshadow the desire to secure
unqualified uniformity. See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLum.
L. REv. 959 (1952); Leflar, supra note 19; Reese, supra note 68; Yntema, The Objectives of
Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721 (1957); cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in SELECTED EssAYs 177.
76 The identity among state laws would necessarily have to be very fine. For example,
even with the same substantive laws, the disposition of cases might depend upon whether
a suit is treated as sounding in contract or tort. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto
Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
77 Uniformity of formal doctrine throughout the forty-eight states is occasionally
desirable, and where that is so a uniform federal substantive law provides the
best means of securing it. But uniformity of obligation as between particular in-
dividuals, regardless of the locus of litigation, is almost invariably desirable; and
the essence of this can be achieved without enacting uniform substantive laws.
The promotion of this kind of uniformity, so far as this can be done without sac-
rifice of greater values, is one of the functions of"the principles of the conflict of
laws.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUm. L. REv. 489, 513-14 (1954).
78 Again, it is assumed that the several jurisdictions concur as to the nature of the
given case. See Hancock, Three Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem: The Classifica-
tory, the Functional, and the Result-Selective, in XX-H CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CON-
Fairs LAw 365 (K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren & J. Hazard eds. 1961). See also A. VON
MEHREN & D. TAUTuAN, supra note 3, at 493-95.
79 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934).
80 See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58
HARv. L. REv. 361, 379-85 (1945).
81 See, e.g., A. VON MEnREN & D. TRAuTMAN, supra note 3, at 63.
82 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 378 (1934).
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tort committed by the other during coverture is too well settled to re-
quire citation of authority."83 The combination of the lex loci rule for
choice of law and the prevailing attitude toward interspousal immunity
dictated that no court would allow an interspousal suit in tort if such
suits were against the policy of the lex loci.
The first Restatement was subjected to vigorous criticism because
of the jurisdiction-selecting nature of the lex loci rule. 4 The attempt of
courts to rationalize its application to the issue of interspousal immunity
by distinguishing between status as a matter of domiciliary concern and
the incidents of status, among them the question of immunity, as a mat-
ter of tort law,8 5 has been exposed as sleight-of-hand servility to that
rule.s6 It has also been noted that:
The "law of the place of the wrong" formula, which has been
adopted in the Restatement . . . was developed primarily in ref-
erence to tort liabilities that were fundamentally admonitory in
character and closely related to the early criminal law concept of
moral "fault." This concept of fault, still very much a part of the
law of torts in spite of the fact that modem enterprise liabilities
are primarily compensatory in character, was incorporated into
the conflict of laws through the adoption of the "place of the
wrong rule .... 87
Hence, the exclusive application of the lex loci rule fails to distinguish
between primary rights and obligations regarding conduct and remedial
rights and obligations arising from such conduct.8 8 This misconception
accounts in part for the tenacity of the lex loci rule and the general fail-
ure to recognize the domicile's interest in the welfare of its own spouses.
83 Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 551-52, 78 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1948). But see Burke
v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 647 (La. Ct. App. 1944), aff'd, 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d
875 (1946).
84 E.g., Cavers, Book Review, 44 YALE LJ. 1478 (1935). Other similar attacks are al-
most too numerous to mention. See W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWs (1949).
85 Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 84, 174 A. 508, 509 (1934), overruled by Thompson v.
Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
86 See Hancock, supra note 1.
87 Ford, supra note 1, at 404 (footnotes omitted). Ford continues:
Since this "place of the wrong" rule was developed in reference to admonitory
tort liabilities, it would be only a happy coincidence if the rule proved to be a
satisfactory and desirable method of dealing with the enterprise liabilities in-
volved in actions to recover for personal injuries suffered in automobile accidents.
Id. (footnote omitted).
88 Mhe present trend in the decisions of courts that still refuse to entertain in-
terspousal actions for personal tort is to base their refusal on grounds of the im-
munity of the defendant or the disability of the plaintiff rather than on the
ground that a cause of action did not arise.
Id. at 399 n.6.
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A look at several early cases discloses the reasoning of another gen-
eration. In Dawson v. Dawson,8 9 a husband and wife domiciled in Ala-
bama were involved in an automobile accident in Mississippi. Accord-
ing to the law of Mississippi, and wife not only lacked a remedy but also
was entirely without a right of action against her husband.90 Citing its
own landmark case of Alabama Great Southern Railway v. Carroll,9 1 the
Alabama court determined that, although the wife could sue the hus-
band under Alabama law, the lex loci must govern. Adhering to the
vested rights theory, the court held that, since Mississippi law gave no
right of action to the wife, none could be enforced in her favor in the
state of her domicile. In response to the objection that the Mississippi
rule of immunity applied only to cases involving Mississippi residents,
the court said:
[I]t would be a most violent assumption to hold that the Missis-
sippi court intended to discriminate against the wives of that state
in favor of those of another state, and we must construe the same
as applicable to all wives who seek redress for torts inflicted upon
them by their husbands in said state regardless of the domicile of
the parties. 2
The court recognized the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the place
of injury.
The only true doctrine is that each sovereignty, state or nation, has
the exclusive power to finally determine and declare what act or
omissions in the conduct of one to another . . . shall impose a
liability in damages for the consequent injury, and the courts of
no other sovereignty can impute a damnifying quality to an act or
omission which afforded no cause of action where it transpired.93
The law-fact pattern of Howard v. Howard94 is identical. There
a husband and wife, residents of North Carolina, were involved in
an automobile accident in New Jersey. The North Carolina court
noted that the plaintiff spent one week in a New Jersey hospital, but at-
tributed no significance to the fact. In a somewhat muddled discussion, 95
the court adhered to the place of injury rule. In discounting plaintiff's
89 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931).
90 Austin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 105 So. 640 (Miss. 1925); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss.
61, 100 So. 591 (1924).
91 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
92 224 Ala. at 15, 188 So. at 415.
93 Id. at 16, 138 So. at 416, citing Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 138-
39, 11 So. 803, 808-09 (1892).
94 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
95 The territorial vested rights theory is mingled with the comity theory. See id. at
577-79, 158 S.E. at 102-04.
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argument that the enforcement of the New Jersey immunity rule would
violate the public policy of North Carolina, the court concluded that no
important policy of North Carolina was at issue.96
In the celebrated case of Gray v. Gray,97 a New Hampshire couple
was involved in an automobile accident in Maine, which retained the
common law rule of interspousal immunity. Adhering to the vested
rights theory, the New Hampshire court determined that under Maine
law the injured wife had no cause of action and that according to the
lex loci rule she could have none anywhere else.98 Secure in the assertion
that "there is no decision in Maine bearing upon the doctrine of ren-
voi,"' 9 9 the court easily sidestepped the possible use of "the rule ... that
in a suit by a non-resident upon a cause of action arising locally his ca-
pacity to sue will be determined by looking to the law of his domicile
rather than to the local law."' 00 Dean Griswold's suggestion that renvoi
would be serviceable here was foredoomed by the absence of authority
indicating what Maine would have done in a similar case.'
Growing awareness that the immunity doctrine expresses a policy
regarding remedies helped to undermine the conceptual foundation of
the lex loci rule. Interestingly, the change was foretold by cases in which
immunity was enforced. In cases involving their own domiciliaries who
were injured in nonimmunity states, those states that wished to main-
tain immunity had to qualify the lex loci rule. Although clothed as a
public policy exception to that rule, the assertion of the immunity doc-
96 Id. at 579-80, 158 SE. at 103-04; see RESTATEMENT OF CONFucr OF LAws § 612
(1934): "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the
enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." Cf. id., Com-
ment b: "A mere difference between the laws of the two states will not render the enforce-
ment of a cause of action created in one state contrary to the public policy of the other."
That the prevalence of the immunity doctrine at that time colored a court's reaction to
this reservation, may be inferred from the assertion of the public policy exception in
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), where the law-fact pattern is reversed.
97 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934), overruled by Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86,
193 A.2d 439 (1963); see Guenther, Changing Choice of Law Rules in Intrafamily and
Other Tort Actions: Comments on Thompson v. Thompson, 7 N.H.B.J. 19 (1964).
98 In addition to its own precedents, the court cited the Restatement, several text au-
thorities, and three then recent cases: Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931),
Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931), and Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis.
248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931), overruled by Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,
95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
99 87 N.H. at 88, 174 A. at 511.
100 Id.
101 See, Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HIAv. L. REv. 1165, 1205-07 (1938), reprinted
in COMm. ON SELECTED ARTiCLE.S ON CONFLICr OF LAws, ASS'N or Aia. LAw ScHooLs, SE-
LEGrE READINGS ON CONFLIar OF LAWs 186-87 (1956); cf. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAurrm ,
supra note 3, at 509-16; von Mehren, supra note 63, at 385-89.
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
trine in such cases was actually a shift to a lex domicilii choice-of-law
rule.
Mertz v. Mertz102 illustrates the struggle of the forum in such a case
to maintain the lex loci rule but simultaneously to escape its conse-
quences. Spouses domiciled in New York, which at the time main-
tained the immunity doctrine, were injured in Connecticut, which had
abandoned the doctrine.1°3 Although the lex loci rule prevailed in New
York as well as in Connecticut,10 4 the court asserted the local policy of
immunity.10 5 A tenuous public policy argument was used as a basis for
classifying the question of immunity as one of remedy. Hence, "[t]he
law of the forum determines ... the capacity of parties to sue or to be
sued, the remedies which are available to suitors and the procedure of
the courts."'0 6 The court reacted to the inappropriateness of abandon-
ing the policy of the domicile simply because the parties were injured
outside New York. "A disability to sue ... arises solely from the marital
status and.., has no relation to a definition of wrong ... .,,107 This view
suggests that the real basis for the decision was the domicile's substan-
tive interest in the marital relationship, and not a mere expansive no-
tion of public policy or a procedural classification. 08
C. The Second Restatement and the Lex Domicilii Rule
Discussion might have begun with Mertz v. Mertz; its expressed
preference for resolution of the immunity issue by reference to the law
of the domicile has been favored by modern commentators.10 9 But the
modern revolt against the lex loci rule is better seen in the more fre-
quently litigated situation where the law of the domicile provides non-
immunity. Cases like Mertz therefore serve as a springboard for investi-
gating whether reference to the law of the domicile is always the best
choice-of-law solution.
102 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
103 Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925).
104 For a criticism of Connecticut's refusal to abandon the lex loci rule in inter-
spousal suits arising from automobile accidents, see Shea, Conflict of Laws: Interspousal
Tort Litigation, 37 CONN. B.J. 520 (1963).
105 271 N.Y. at 473, 3 N.E.2d at 599-600.
106 Id. at 473, 3 N.E.2d at 599.
107 Id. at 473-74, 3 N.E.2d at 600.
108 See G. ST--MBERG, PRNc'Las OF CoNfLicr oF LAws 206 (3d ed. 1963). For a recent
rehabilitation of the Mertz case along similar lines, see Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952,
277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1967). "We know that a New York marital relationship and the
ramifications thereof will prevail in the face of an occurrence in a foreign state whose laws
permit an action within the relationship contrary to our own." Id. at 955, 277 N.Y.S.2d at
327, citing Mertz.
109 See Hancock, supra note 1; Shea, supra note 104.
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In the California case of Emery v. Emery,110 an automobile accident
occurred in Idaho involving a father and his minor children. The law of
Idaho appeared to be silent on the question of immunity in such a case.
The law of California, where the parties were domiciled and where suit
was brought, provided no cases involving an action by a minor child for
a willful or malicious tort." The opinion of Justice Traynor resolved
the choice of law in favor of the domicile.
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit
because of a family relationship are more properly determined by
reference to the law of the state of the family domicile. That state
has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the
incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which
the parties can, by participation in the legislative process, effect a
change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the
rights, duties, disabilities and immunities conferred or imposed by
the family relationship should constantly change as members of the
family cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their
home.112
Hence the California court was free to adopt the modern trend of
decisions and allow the suit for the reason that "the lack of such im-
munity does not conflict with or inhibit reasonable parental dis-
cipline."" 3
110 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
111 Ordinary negligence would not have been enough under California law. Id. at
429-20, 289 P.2d at 223-24.
112 Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
113 Id. at 429, 289 P.2d at 223. Similarly, the case of Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966), is interesting. A Minnesota parent brought suit against her child, who
was a minor when the accident occurred in Wisconsin, but was emancipated at the time of
suit. Under Wisconsin law at the time of the accident, a parent could not assert a tort claim
against an unemancipated child. Minnesota had never squarely passed on the question, but
had assumed that the matter was to be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
tort occurred, unless some overriding local policy made the application of foreign law un-
acceptable. See Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941). Rather than base its deci-
sion on an outmoded public policy concept, the court considered Minnesota's relation to
the facts of the case. 278 Minn. at 424, 142 N.W.2d at 69. In addition to the fact that Min-
nesota was the domicile of the parties, the court noted that the vehicle involved was ga-
raged and insured in Minnesota. The court also weighed the economic impact on the Min-
nesota family and insurer and determined that this was "a matter of family law rather
than tort law and that Minnesota is free to establish its own policy of immunity without
being bound by that of Wisconsin." Id. at 425, 142 N.W.2d at 70. The court thereupon
ruled prospectively that the parent-child immunity should no longer be a defense. The
court would probably have reached a similar result in a purely domestic case, but here it
not only established a choice-of-law rule in favor of the domicile but also brought its do-
mestic rule within the fold of more modern thought; otherwise a change in choice-of-law
rule would have been unnecessary. It must be noted, however, that the Minnesota court in
a subsequent decision involving purely domestic facts adhered to the interspousal immu-
nity doctrine. Hovanetz v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1967).
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In a celebrated "package deal reversal"" 4 of previous Wisconsin
authority, the court in Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co." 5
quoted the foregoing language with approval and determined that, since
the issue of interspousal immunity was one of domestic relations, the
law of the domicile should control. This view has been adopted by the
second Restatement.16 Section 379(1) provides that "the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and
with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort." Section
390g provides specifically that "[i]n accordance with the rule of § 879,
whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to an-
other member of the family is determined by the local law of the state of
their domicil." No distinction is made between cases in which the do-
micile has a policy of immunity and those in which it has a policy of
nonimmunity.117
D. The Merits of the Lex Domicilii Rule
A lex domicilii rule is sounder than a lex loci rule because the do-
micile state has the stronger interests concerning whether family mem-
bers should sue each other. Nevertheless, in form, lex domicilii is merely
a jurisdiction-selecting rule. If reference to the law of the domicile is in-
variably the best solution then the rule may represent a proper syn-
thesis of the competing concerns." 8 But if use of the lex domicilii is not
114 See Hancock, supra note 1; Note, 73 H~Av. L. Rlv. 785 (1960).
115 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). For an interesting analysis of the case that
considers the fact that the marriage was annulled after the acddent, see Jayme, supra
note 1, at 325-29. This fact was not treated as material by the court.
116 RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
117 In his concurring opinion in Haumschild, Justice Fairchild suggests:
Another possible alternative would be that the forum state when faced with
the question of immunity choose the law of whichever state (locus or domicil)
conforms more closely to its own. The party adversely affected by such a rule can
be said to have subjected himself to the law of the domicil state by choosing to
live in it or to the law of the locus state by choosing to travel in it. Our legisla-
ture has set up a similar rule for a choice of law with respect to the mode of exe-
cution of a will outside of Wisconsin.
7 Wis. 2d at 145, 95 N.W.2d at 822. Such a rule is pure jurisdiction-selection. (The refer-
ence to the wills problem is inapt here because that rule is adopted for the purpose of in-
creasing the chances of validation.) It bears some formal similarity to a solution suggested
by Professor Currie for the problems of choice of law in a disinterested forum. See Currie,
supra note 59.
118 The jurisdiction-selecting rule makes a state the object of choice; in theory
it is only after the rule has selected the governing state by reference to the "contact"
prescribed in the rule that the court ascertains the content of the state's law....
[H]owever . . .a jurisdiction-selecting rule may be the product of two decisions
choosing on policy grounds between competing rules in cases in which the law-
fact patterns are reversed. If the court concludes that the same contact should
be controlling in each case, economy in stating the results would yield a choice-
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always the best resolution, then the rule is merely a better jurisdiction-
selecting rule.
By modern reckoning, Buckeye v. Buckeye" 9 represents the most
extreme application of the lex loci rule.120 A Wisconsin couple was in-
volved in an automobile accident in Illinois. After the start of litigation
in Wisconsin, the parties married. Wisconsin permits suits between
spouses for tort, including antenuptial torts. By the law of Illinois, how-
ever, the marriage of the parties extinguished the "cause of action." Ig-
noring the interest of Wisconsin in its own residents, the court deter-
mined that "the law governing the creation and extent of tort liability
is that of the place where the tort was committed."'12 The converse situ-
ation was presented in Forbes v. Forbes,'22 where Illinois spouses were
involved in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. Although the wife
could not have sued her husband in their home state, the Wisconsin
court distinguished status from its incidents and allowed the suit in
Wisconsin. "[W]hile they were here their personal duties, obligations,
and liabilities incidental to that status were such as existed or arose un-
der our laws in relation to the legality, effect, and consequences of their
transactions within this state."' u
If Judge Traynor correctly asserted in Emery v. Emery 24 that the
domicile state has an interest in the "incidents" of the marital status of
its domiciliaries, then the Wisconsin court made the wrong choice of
law in both cases. Even if the place where the accident occurred in
Forbes had a reasonable interest in applying its own nonrestrictive law,
a paradox still remains. Wisconsin allowed foreign spouses to escape the
immunity afforded by the law of their home state, while it imposed im-
munity upon its local spouses when they were involved in an accident in
an immunity state. Wisconsin thus became the agent of a restrictive pol-
of-law rule stated in terms of the jurisdiction where that contact is located.
However, in the use of a rule thus synthesized, its origin should always be
kept in mind.
D. CAvEas, supra note 2, at 9 n.24. See also id. at 178.
119 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931), overruled by Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
120 The case has been the object of repeated attack. E.g., Ford, supra note 1; Hancock,
supra note 1.
121 203 Wis. at 250, 234 N.W. at 342; cf. Comment, Functional Application of Con-
flict of Laws Rules in Torts Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 12"33 (1935). The law-fact pattern of
Buckeye is repeated with the same result in Garlin v. Garlin, 260 Wis. 187, 50 N.W.2d
373 (1951).
122 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938), overruled by Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 180, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
123 Id. at 484, 277 N.W. at 115.
124 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
icy, which it applied to the obvious, and perhaps invidious, disadvan-
tage of its own citizens. Clearly, the lex loci rule as such does not repre-
sent a functional synthesis of the policies involved in either of these two
cases.125
The uneasiness of the Wisconsin court in handling these cases is
shown in Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. 1 28 There again
a Wisconsin couple was involved in an automobile accident in Illinois.
Working in the shadow of Buckeye, the court reviewed Illinois authori-
ties and found that the Illinois Married Women's Act 127 was remedial
and therefore would not bar suit between Wisconsin residents after an
accident in Illinois.12 Thus, the court applied the lex loci to determine
whether a cause of action existed, and still furthered the interests of the
domiciliary state by applying its own law regarding the incidents of the
marital status. The accommodation reached suggests a functional ap-
proach to the problem, in spite of the result-oriented spirit of the
opinion. Upon rehearing, the Wisconsin court decided that its interpre-
tation of Illinois law had been erroneous. 129 The result was saved, how-
ever, by the Haumschild case, decided the same day, and the law of the
domicile was applied regardless of the interpretation of the immunity
doctrine in Illinois. While considering a number of different conceptual
solutions to the problem 30 and overturning previous authority,131 the
court settled upon the law of the domicile as the proper reference for
determining whether to apply interspousal immunity. In the Haums-
child case, a "false conflict" was presented: the law of the domicile al-
lowed interspousal suits and the law of the place of the accident prohib-
125 See generally D. CAvERs, supra note 2, at 139-80.
126 5 Wis. 2d 306, 92 N.W.2d 759 (1959).
127 "[N]either husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the person com-
mitted during coverture." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959). This provision
was originally passed in response to Brandt v. Keller, 413 Iln. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952),
which had departed from the immunity doctrine. The remedial characterization in
Bodenhagen seems to reflect a preference for the use of forum law on a matter of
procedure.
128 Particularly where, as here, the married people involved are domiciled in
a state where public policy recognizes both the cause of action and the right
to sue, there is no reason to suppose that the Illinois legislature was concerned
with barring liability completely.
5 Wis. 2d at 310a, 92 N.W.2d at 762.
129 "There is no question that such immunity at common law was substantive in
nature." 5 Wis. 2d at 310b, 95 N.W.2d at 823 (per curiam opinion on rehearing).
130 See Hancock, supra note 1; Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 785 (1960).
131 The court did not distinguish between immunity and nonimmunity in the cases
overruled. For a criticism of this indiscriminate style of reversal, see Cavers, in Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLuM. L. RFay.
1219, 1222 (1963).
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ited them. In rejecting the use of the renvoi doctrine to dispel the
conflict, the court may have neglected a more rational basis for dispos-
ing of the converse situation.1 32
To determine whether the rule expressed is a jurisdiction-selecting
rule, its application in the converse fact situation must be considered.138
In Pirc v. Kortebein,134 a post-Haumschild case, Illinois spouses sued in
a federal district court in Wisconsin after an automobile accident in
Wisconsin. The defendant claimed contribution from the husband's
insurer by reason of the husband's negligence. In applying the law of
the spouses' domicile the court held that because the wife could not sue
the husband there was no common liability between the negligent par-
ties, and the defendant was denied contribution. But the court applied
the law of the domicile without regard to the interests of Wisconsin as
place of injury, thereby indicating that the Haumschild rule is appar-
ently a jurisdiction-selecting rule.
A strict lex domicilii rule does not distinguish between the domi-
cile's inherent concern with the marital status and its shared concern
with the incidents of that status. Of course, in interspousal immunity
cases exclusive reference to the law of the domicile is more satisfactory
than exclusive reference to the lex loci. False-conflict cases are then de-
cided appropriately. Further, the domicile has a more particular inter-
est in asserting its immunity policy in the face of a more liberal policy of
the lex loci than the locus has in the converse situation in expanding its
own immunity in the face of a more liberal policy of the domicile.
Now that Wisconsin had adopted the choice-of-law method of Bab-
cock v. Jackson,13 5 it remains to be seen whether its adherence to the lex
domicilii rule will be constant. In expressing a presumption in favor of
the lex fori when the lex loci is repugnant to the public policy of Wis-
consin,186 Wisconsin might apply its nonimmunity rule when spouses
132 Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 141-42, 95 N.W.2d 814, 820
(1959). In discussing Haumschild, Professor von Mehren observes that courts "often fail
to see that the renvoi can be a step in the direction of . . . functional analysis and
reject its use." von Mehren, supra note 63, at 385 n.1.
133 The answer was foreshadowed in Haumschild:
The adoption of the new rule would not in theory close the doors of our courts
to a nonresident spouse in such a situation instituting suit in Wisconsin.
However, the defendant spouse might have a good defense in bar if he pleaded,
and proved, the true state of domicile, and took the proper steps to bring before
the trial court the law of such state granting the immunity.
7 Wis. 2d at 139-40, 95 N.W.2d at 819.
134 186 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
185 12 N.Y.2d 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1968). See Wilcox v. Wilcox,
26 Wis. 2d 617, 188 N.W.2d 408 (1965); ef. Peterson v. Warren, 81 Wis. 2d 547, 143
N.W.2d 560 (1966).
130 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 684-35, 188 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965).
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from an immunity state are involved in an automobile accident in Wis-
consin. At least one court has held, however, that this presumption is
overcome by the "inherent claim of the domiciliary state to vindication
of its policy," and has applied the immunity policy of the domicile.18 7 It
is noteworthy, however, that domiciliary immunity is selected because
of a "mild presumption" in favor of the lex domicilii rather than be-
cause of an invariable jurisdiction-selecting rule.18 Discarding the
"mild presumption," of course, could lead to a rule of alternative refer-
ence.
E. Interspousal Immunity in Suits Involving Third Parties
1. Spouse v. Husband's Employer
In actions by the injured spouse against a third party, the presence
of immunity has been held not to benefit the third party.139 A consider-
ation of this kind of case in a conflicts setting reveals not only that inter-
spousal immunity is treated as a matter of remedy but also that inter-
spousal immunity can and should be relegated wherever possible to
purely domestic fact situations.
As the remedial analysis indicates, the husband is not privileged to
cause negligent injury to his wife. The immunity defense is personal to
him, and the policy considerations that support it are not necessarily rel-
evant in a suit against the negligent spouse's employer.140 Further, the
doctrine of respondeat superior is increasingly viewed as a doctrine of
strict liability imposed as a cost of enterprise risk. The older view of the
doctrine as one of substitutional responsibility limited by the personal
liability of the agent has become outmoded.14' The modern view is that
137 Magid v. Decker, 251 F. Supp. 955, 959 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
138 Indeed, although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin may ultimately define
more dearly the effect of Haumschild and Haynie in the post-Wilcox era, here
and now, in this federal diversity action, we consider this court obliged to afford
*a mild presumption in favor of the application of the law of the domicile of
the spouses.
Id.
139 E.g., Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 861 P.2d 64 (1961) (wife v. husband's
employer).
140 In an action against a principal based on the conduct of a servant in the
course of his employment: . . . (b) The principal has no defense because of
the fact that: . . . (ii) the agent had an immunity from dvil liability as to
the act.
RaSrATEmzNT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 217 (1957).
Thus, where a servant in the scope of employment negligently runs over his
wife, an action against the master by the injured wife is not barred. This result
is in accordance with the rule stated in this Section and is the rule adopted in
most of the States.
Id. comment b.
.41 Morris, supra note 46, at 55.,
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the mere negligence of the agent creates liability, and that the agent
need not be personally responsible to the person he injures.142 Since the
unanimous decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Schubert v.
Schubert Wagon Go.,143 most cases have reached this result, recognizing
that the employer, and not the husband, is the real party defendant even
where both are joined.144 Hence, the goal of preserving family harmony
is subordinated to the policy of responsibility embodied in respondeat
superior. Whether the employer will sue his negligent servant is conjec-
tural. Even so, his right to recover is based upon the employee's duty to
render faithful service to the employer, and not upon a right of indem-
nity.145 Thus, the family exchequer is not threatened by the immediate
suit. If, as is likely today, the employer is insured, the loss is absorbed by
an increase in insurance premiums, which is a cost of doing business. 40
The cost of insurance is ultimately recovered in the course of conmer-
cial enterprise. Although interspousal immunity prevails in most juris-
dictions, the majority view is that this immunity will not bar recovery
from the negligent spouse's employer.
In Jones v. Kinney,147 suit was brought in a United States District
142 Moreover, it would be a sad reflection upon the courts if a group of people
were injured in one accident by an employee and everyone injured could re-
cover from the employer but the wife of the negligent employee.
Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 61, 361 P.2d 64, 71 (1961).
143 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
144 For a recent collection of these cases, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 677 (1965).
145 Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961).
146 And finally, if the prospect of a suit for indemnity were a lively one, there
is the possibility that upon a balancing of considerations the right to indemnity
would yield to the right of the injured spouse, that is to say, that indemnity from
the negligent spouse would be denied.
Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 NJ. 537, 541, 170 A.2d 241, 243 (1961). To the effect that
a more recent legislative policy requiring insurance compensation would prevail over
the somewhat outmoded notion of preserving family harmony, see Sullivan v. Christiensen,
191 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (dictum) (child v. parent's employer after injury sus-
tained in automobile accident). For a suggestion that Illinois, which proscribes inter-
spousal suits by express statutory provision, ILL. ANsI. STAT. ch. 68, § I (Smith-Hurd
1959), may continue to allow the injured wife to sue the negligent husband's administrator,
see Keegan, The Family and Tort Actions: Liability and Immunity, 1962 U. ILL. L.F.
557, 560-62; Survey, 32 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 1, 63 (1953). For an English case allowing suit
in the face of similar statutory expression of interspousal immunity, see Broom v.
Morgan, [1953] 1 Q.B. 597, [1953] 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A.). The Law Reform (Husband
and Wife) Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 48, now allows the spouses to sue each other
in tort.
147 113 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (denying summary judgment to both parties).
Jones v. Avco Mfg. Co., 218 F.2d 406 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955),
affirmed a judgment n.o.v. for the employer. The Eighth Circuit held that under the
general rules of agency the employer was not liable to the wife because the agent,
for reasons of his -own, took her as a ,passenger- on a business- trip without the knowledge
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Court by an injured wife against her husband's employer and the driver
of the other car involved. The employer, by third party complaint,
brought in the husband to recover from him whatever damages might
be assessed against it. The spouses were residents of Michigan, which
recognized interspousal immunity148 and did not recognize the liability
of the employer in such a case.149 Missouri, the domicile of the other
party, recognized interspousal immunity, 5 0 but allowed recovery against
the employer.' 5' Delaware, the corporate domicile of the employer, also
recognized interspousal immunity, 52 but whether it allowed recovery
against the employer was uncertain.153 Without discussion of choice-of-
law, the court sought to apply the law of Kansas, the place of injury.
Kansas had interspousal immunity, 54 but there was no Kansas authority
concerning whether the employer could be held responsible. The court
decided that the employer should be accountable because that was the
better view and was in accord with the weight of authority.
Neither the jurisdiction-selecting rule pointing to the place of in-
jury nor the characterization of the issue as simply one of agency is very
helpful. Admittedly, the court's choice-of-law rule was imposed by the
Klaxon doctrine. 55 The lex loci rule forced the court to reach an en-
lightened result, but purely as a matter of what a Kansas court might be
expected to do in the given case.
An interest analysis would reach the same result. Yet, something
more than a balance in favor of the majority rule and a citation to the
Restatement of Agency 50 is needed to provide enlightenment. The
problem is one of competition between the policies of interspousal im-
munity and respondeat superior. Michigan, the domicile of the spouses
gave priority to the doctrine of interspousal immunity; it would
not allow the wife to sue the employer when she could not sue the em-
ployee. In this conflicts setting, however, Michigan's policy was subordi-
or authority of the employer. It became unnecessary, therefore, to consider whether Kansas
law would permit her to sue her husband's employer in tort. Id. at 408-09.
148 Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939). The doctrine was par-
tially abrogated in Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965).
149 Watkinson v. Reichle, 292 Mich. 484, 290 N.W. 877 (1940).
150 See Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).
151 Mullaly v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936)
(dictum).
152 See Saunders V. Hill, 202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964).
153 For recent authority, see Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., 215 A.2d 427 (Del. 1965)
(suit by wife against husband's employer upheld).
154 Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952).
155 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (federal court in diversity
jurisdiction must follow conflict of laws rules of the state in which it sits).
156 RESTATEMENT OF AGzNCY § 217 (1933). See note 140 supra for the present version.
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nated to a policy that was in keeping with the trend to distribute loss as
a cost of enterprise. The effect of the choice-of-law rule was to accelerate
the view of the growing majority and to localize the impact of the di-
minishing immunity doctrine. Although the problem may be viewed as
one primarily involving employer liability, it arises because of the pres-
ence of interspousal immunity. The solution depends upon whether or
not the immunity should be localized.
Arguably, the admonitory function of legal standards for conduct
on the highway is stronger in this kind of case, because a corporate em-
ployer is more responsive to the need to have its drivers conform to such
standards. The place of a particular accident may be fortuitous, but the
incidence of accidents as a feature of doing interstate business is in a
general sense predictable. Further, even without considerations of in-
surance, the choice is not that of shifting loss from the injured party to
the negligent party, but that of shifting loss from concentration upon
the injured party to distribution through the employment enterprise.
In Jones v. Kinney, Kansas law was paramount not because it was the
law of the place of injury but because its terms served to distribute
loss.' 57 The usefulness of a choice-of-law rule of alternative reference is
evident, for even if the Kansas law had been otherwise, the place of in-
jury could have little interest in concentrating loss in a case not involv-
ing its own domiciliaries. Moreover, if the domiciliary state allows
recovery against the employer, it has disavowed any priority for inter-
spousal immunity between its own domiciliaries and can have no objec-
tion to the distribution of loss in an out-of-state accident involving
them. Thus, it is reasonable to select the law of either the domicile of
the spouses or the place of the accident, depending upon which exposes
the employer to suit by the injured spouse. Finally, the law of the em-
ployer's domicile or principal place of business might serve as an addi-
tional basis of reference when its policy is to distribute loss.
2. Wife v. Owner of Automobile Negligently Operated
by Her Husband
A principle of alternative reference can be used to give wider
scope to a policy of owner liability, as well as to cut down the scope
of the immunity doctrine. Here we posit a conflict between the
doctrine of interspousal immunity and an owner liability act that ren-
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390g, comment b at 142
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964), restricting the application of lex domicilii to cases involving
the spouses themselves. Hence, the choice of law to govern whether the injured spouse
can sue the employer would turn upon which state has the most significant concern
with that issue. See also id. § 379.
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ders the owner liable for the negligent operation of his vehicle. 1 8 Even
within a single jurisdiction the conflict of policies seems to be between
extremes; the immunity policy concentrates loss, while the policy of
owner liability merely shifts loss to a basis without fault or enterprise
involvement. But this shift of loss rests upon the availability of loss dis-
tribution through insurance coverage. Thus, the conflict in policies can
be reformulated: the immunity policy is still an extreme, but the owner
liability policy is a risk-distributing mechanism, radical perhaps, but in
keeping with the modern trend. The inevitability of loss through auto-
mobile accidents and the owner's "involvement" through his owner-
ship are demonstrable. The owner's responsibility, moreover, continues
to be based on the negligence of the driver, and thus his responsibility
still has a traditional basis.
The extension of the immunity of the spouse to shield the owner
serves only to inhibit the policy of invoking the owner's liability. In or-
der to give full scope to that policy, a choice-of-law principle of alterna-
tive reference is necessary. Where the domicile of the spouses and the
place of injury each have a policy of owner liability, the choice-of-law
problem is similar to that in suits by the wife against the husband's em-
ployer. If the domicile allows suit against the owner, a choice of that law
in the case of an out-of-state accident offends no interest of the place of
injury. If the place of injury allows such suits, a choice of its law asserts
its interest in assuring compensation for the victims of accidents on its
highways. The domiciliary state is still free to assert its inhibitive policy
in purely local cases. Thus, if the owner liability policy of either the do-
micile or the place of injury extends to the benefit of an injured spouse,
that state's law should apply.159
3. Wife v. Concurrent Tort Feasor: The Latter's Right of
Contribution Against the Negligent Spouse
In LaChance v. Service Trucking Co.,160 a husband and wife, resi-
dents of Maine, were involved in a two-car collision in North Carolina
158 It is assumed that the owner is not in the business of renting automobiles. The
discussion focuses attention upon the more difficult case, where the owner's affairs
are not being furthered by the operation of the automobile and responsibility to the
injured party is made to rest upon the unadorned fact of ownership. Where the com-
mercial enterprise of renting automobiles is involved, a resolution somewhat along the
lines of the treatment of respondeat superior in this context may be expected. For a
result-oriented decision in favor of distribution of loss, see Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). For a result-oriented discussion
of variations on the Levy case, see A. EHRNZaEIG, CONFLICr OF LAWS 574-75 (1962).
159 Arguably, the scheme of alternative reference could also include the domicile of
the owner.
160 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963). ..
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with a vehicle operated by an employee of a Maryland corporation. The
wife sued the driver of the other vehicle, who, in turn, brought a third
party complaint against the husband for contribution. Maine' 61 and
Maryland 62 retain the doctrine of interspousal immunity; North Caro-
lina 163 has abandoned it. Maine and Maryland would not have allowed
contribution; North Carolina, lacking the immunity policy, would have
permitted it.164 The court chose North Carolina law and allowed con-
tribution.
Professor Currie's approval of this result in the case is based upon
his interpretation that the case involved an avoidable conflict between
the interests of Maine and North Carolina.'65 Currie emphasizes North
Carolina's interest in deterrence and in affording security for local
creditors. Since the suit was not between husband and wife, fears
of collusion, family discord, and depletion of the family exchequer
were mitigated. Further, Maine might have localized its noncontribu-
tion policy to avoid conflict with the policy of North Carolina. 66 At
first impression, Professor Currie's argument seems attenuated. The
assertion that Maine might adopt a "moderate and restrained" con-
struction of its noncontribution policy is not based upon any position
taken by that state. Further, the interest of North Carolina in pro-
tecting local creditors is not based upon any demonstrated need in
this case. Such an interest may, however, be assumed on the basis of
reasonable policy considerations; otherwise, choice-of-law in these
cases would depend upon particularized reference to secondary in-
terests. 167 The proper merit of Currie's argument, however, may be
161 See Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 A. 669 (1932).
162 Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960). It is unlikely that Maryland
had any interest in having its own law applied here; but since the defendant third party
was a Maryland corporation, the federal district court sitting in a diversity case had
little justification for a dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. See D. CAVERS,
supra note 2, at 110 n.51.
163 See Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 $.E.2d 646 (1965).
164 See generally W. PRossER, ToRTs § 47, at 273-78 (3d ed. 1964).
165 Maryland was in the position of the disinterested third state. Having no
interest in the application of its own law and policy, it was confronted with
an apparent conflict between the interests of Maine and North Carolina. But
after careful analysis the interest of Maine could be moderately defined, with
the result that conflict was avoided and the law of the only interested state was
applied.
Currie, supra note 59, at 771.
16 Id, at 771-72. Subsequent to LaChance, Maine allowed contribution in an auto-
mobile accident case involving interspousal immunity. Bedell v. Reagan, 159, Me. 292,
194 A2d 24 (1963).
167 "ifihe financial hazard of the state of injury may seem too erratic or too narrow
a basis for applying its law." D. CAvm.s, supra note 2, at 178-89.
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phrased thus: contribution was necessary to the maintenance of North
Carolina's policy of deterring negligent conduct on its highways; the
assertion of a noncontribution policy would have frustrated this interest
and done little to serve Maine's interests in preserving interspousal
immunity and noncontribution. Again the competing policies are
resolved in favor of distributing loss, and the noncontribution policy
(derived from the immunity doctrine) of a concerned jurisdiction is
localized.168 Interspousal immunity in a conflicts setting is thus par-
tially abrogated. The husband is made to bear part of the loss to his
wife by reason of the imposition of an obligation to contribute to
the other party, and as such is rendered only partly immune.
In Goulding v. Sands,169 New York spouses were involved in a
collision in Pennsylvania with an automobile driven by a resident of
that state. After a judgment of contribution for the driver of the other
car against the spouse of the injured party,170 the latter's insurance
carrier alleged that no coverage existed. The policy did not expressly
cover injuries to the spouse, and under New York law this would have
precluded insurer liability. 17 ' In rejecting the insurer's denial of
168 In Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962), the court refused
to permit the defendant to implead the husband's insurance carrier because the non-
contribution policy of the spouses' domicile, Illinois, would be subverted.
It is thus apparent that this court was fully mindful of the prospective
application of the Haumschild rule to litigation arising from torts committed in
this state. Whether the accident was a one-car accident or a two-car accident
would seem to have no bearing on the proper rule to be applied.
.... If the appellants' position were adopted it would mean that Mrs. Haynie
could not sue her husband in her own state of Illinois, but she could do so
in Wisconsin.
Id. at 302, 114 N.W.2d at 445. The court does not seem to have perceived the propriety
of a solution like that reached in LaChance. With some justification, Professor Weintraub
treats this case as one involving a "spurious" conflict. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 219.
Whether the Babcock approach displayed in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 630-31, 133
N.W.2d 408, 414-15 (1965) (preference for fixed reference), would alter the result is not
yet decided. See note 138 supra.
169 237 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 355 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1966).
170 The contribution judgment against the insured was rendered because under
Pennsylvania law contribution is permitted between joint tortfeasors even when the
injured party has no cause of action against one of them. "The theory is that as between
the two tort-feasors contribution is not a recovery for the tort but the enforcement
of an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done." Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa.
219, 221, 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1955) (contribution upheld against husband of injured spouse,
although husband himself could not be held responsible). This is a minority view, but
quite consistent with the views expressed in this article. See W. PROSSER, supra note 164,
§ 47, at 277; Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors when One Tortfeasor Enjoys a
Special Defense Against Action by the Injured Party, 52 CoRNEL. L.Q. 407 (1967).
171 The company relied on N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(3) (McKinney 1966). 237 F. Supp.
at 578.
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liability, the court held that New York law did not govern the New
York insurer's liability, although the insurance contract was executed
in New York. There was no clear precedent in Pennsylvania, and the
court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, applied the choice-of-law method
established by the Pennsylvania court in Griffith v. United Airlines.172
By a "grouping of contacts" the court found that the "center of gravity"
resided in Pennsylvania's greater concern with the issue of insurer
liability. Both the insurer, which does business in New York and Penn-
sylvania, and the insured "were on notice that the insured would drive
across state lines and subject residents of other states to potential injury
and, in turn, subject both to the laws of other states." 173 The court
went on to express an interest analysis that might have pleased Pro-
fessor Currie:
The Courts of Pennsylvania should be interested in Goulding,
a resident of said State, who unquestionably would be injured and
prejudiced by the application of the New York statute. Penn-
sylvania's interest is apparent in protecting its residents from injury
either bodily or pecuniary from out-of-state residents while travel-
ing on its highways.174
Thus, the court reached a solution that served to distribute loss and
to localize the effect of the stricter provision of the New York law of
insurance. Of course, that solution could not have been reached with-
out dwelling upon the foreseeability of the insured's incurring a
greater liability than that permitted under his insurance policy ac-
cording to the law of the place of contracting. Nevertheless, enlarging
insurer liability on the basis of the laws of other states concerned with
its activities seems reasonable. A decision articulated in terms of alter-
native reference would have served the same end. It would also have
expressed more clearly the interstate nature of insurance operations and
the desirability of resolving the choice-of-law problem in favor of
allowing compensation.
172 Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
173 237 F. Supp. at 579.
174 Id. The Third Circuit affirmed on different grounds, finding that:
Both the Courts of Pennsylvania and New York are in accord that, in a
given situation, where the insurance policy has a provision which renders it
inapplicable to a particular loss, or if the policy does not provide a given
coverage for a particular loss, the carrier is not permitted to manage and defend
the assured throughout pretrial and trial proceedings, have judgment rendered
against the policyholder, and then, when execution on the judgment threatens,
belatedly disclaim coverage and liability.
Goulding v. Sands, 335 F.2d 230, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1966). It must be admitted that the
doctrine of estoppel, commonly held by New York and Pennsylvania, avoids the conflict
and therefore supports an easier solution.
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F. Interspousal Immunity and the Community Property States
Automobile tort litigation involving spouses from a community
property state 75 may be an exception to the principle of alternative
reference. 7 For example, where the tort claim of the wife is treated
as community property, recovery against her husband would produce
a redundancy similar to that which obtained at common law. Further,
one spouse's negligence may be imputed to the other in a suit by the
injured spouse against a third party, in order to prevent the commu-
nity from profiting from the misconduct of the negligent partner. 77
The husband, as manager of the community, may be the only one
entitled to bring suit, or he may be an indispensable party, as at com-
mon law.
In Traglio v. Harris,178 a California family, in a car driven by the
son, was involved in a collision with a truck in Oregon. Suits by the
husband and wife against the other driver were brought in Oregon, a
common law jurisdiction. Under California law the negligence of the
son was imputable to the father and, since any recovery by the wife
175 When the spouses are from a common law state and the injury occurs in a
community property state, the courts have had little difficulty referring to the law of
the domicile, since the matter involves marital status and property. In Bruton v. Villoria,
138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956), the court refused to impute the contributory
negligence of the husband to the wife according to the law of California, a community
property state. According to the law of their domicile, Ontario, the husband had no
interest in damages recovered by his wife. In Reeves v. Schulmeier, 303 F.2d 802 (5th
Cir. 1962), although the lex loci rule prevailed, the court, with no Texas authority in
point, applied the law of the spouses' domicile, Oklahoma, rather than the law of Texas,
where the accident occurred and under whose law the wife's cause of action for damages
would have been community property. In Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d
740 (1952), when Wisconsin still followed the lex loci rule, the court had no hesitancy
in using its own law to determine that a Wisconsin spouse retained the right to sue
her husband although the cause of action arose in Arizona, a community property state.
The court's treatment of Arizona law is questionable. See cases collected in Annot., 97
A.L.R.2d 725 (1964).
176 Where the spouses are domiciliaries of a common law state, the only drawback
to a principle of alternative reference in favor of the nonimmunity policy appears when
the common law domicile itself has an immunity policy. Then, unless the law of the
community property state, the place of injury, nevertheless allows the wife to sue her
husband to recover, there would be no alternative, since both states inhibit suit-the
domicile by the common law immunity, the place of injury by the regime of community
property.
Cf. Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So. 2d 253 (1942). Under the law
of the domicile, Texas, an action in damages for personal injury by a married woman was
community property and could be maintained only by the husband. Under the law of
the place of injury, Louisiana, the right to recover for personal injury was her separate
property, and she was allowed to bring suit.
177 See W. PaossER, supra note 164, § 73, at 503.
178 104 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 629 (1939).
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would have been for the benefit of the family, recovery had to be
denied in order to prevent the husband from benefiting from his own
negligence. The court held that the law of the place of injury governed
both the existence of a cause of action and any defenses to it. Since
under Oregon law the negligence of the child was not imputable to the
mother unless she exercised control over the child, her claim was estab-
lished.179 The dissent reasoned that the proper issue before the court
was: "[w]hat law is applicable to determine the ownership of the cause
of action and of the proceeds thereof ,for the injury to the wife?"'81 0
Thus, the preliminary question was one of property, and the law of
the domicile, California, ought to control. 81 This threshold inquiry
would have defeated the wife's claim for relief.
The problem is to avoid application of the law of the community
property domicile when it inhibits a spouse's claim for relief against
a third party. Where the forum is also the place of injury this result
has been reached by treating the matter as one of tort and following
the lex loci rule.8 2 While the result may be satisfactory, a mechanical
characterization of this sort seems to require that the wife from a
common law state be deprived of a remedy when her injury occurs in
a community property state. 8 3 Upon a closer analysis, however, the
real issue, as with interspousal immunity, is what remedy the wife can
claim when she has been injured by tortious operation of an auto-
mobile. Before the forum at the place of injury the question becomes
that of the effect to be given -to the incidents of the domicile's commu-
nity property regime in the face of the policy of general responsibility
of the law of the place of injury. Both the imputation of the husband's
negligence to the wife and the requirement that he be joined as a
party to the suit are based solely on community property considerations.
Since there are no considerations of court order or management in
179 Oregon preserves the interspousal immunity doctrine. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239
Ore. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964).
180 104 F.2d at 444.
181 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLcr OF LAWs, §§ 208, 290 (1934); cf. A. VON MEaMEN & D.
TRAUTMAN, supra note 3, at 506. For a discussion of the Traglio case that is sympathetic
to the dissent, see Hancock, supra note 78, at 375-79.
182 Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 629 (1939)
(suit by wife against third party); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 97 F. 837 (8th Cir. 1899),
aff'd, 181 U.S. 57 (1901) (rejection of domiciliary law requiring joinder of husband
because damages claimed would be community property). As to the specter of double
recovery, see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 61 (1901); Hancock, supra note 78,
at 373 n.2.
183 See the dissent in Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
308 U.S. 629 (1939). That this involves a "conceptual quandary," see Hancock, supra
note 78, at 377. For an analysis of the case, see id. at 375-79. - •
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the common law forum, the joinder requirement can be disregarded
as a mere procedural adjunct to a property regime that is not directly
involved.8 4 Since the imputation of the husband's negligence is not a
function of the law of the place of injury, its role in the litigation is
irrelevant. When the policy of the place of injury is to extend a remedy
to the wife, the forum can assert the interest that sustains that policy.
Even if a resulting judgment is considered property, it is property as
bestowed by the law of the place of injury. Community property inci-
dents will be relevant to the judgment only if the community prop-
erty regime may be imposed immediately upon property acquired in
other states.'8 5 To say that the incidents attach because of the law of
the domicile is to beg the question. The forum has a reasonable basis
for asserting the remedial policy of the place of injury, and whether
the law of the domicile is later invoked in a related matter is not the
forum's concern.
The more difficult problem arises when the suit is brought at the
domicile. Here the forum is the agent of the community property
policy, and its own domiciliaries are before it. The difficulty is in sub-
ordinating the domicile's policy to that of the place of injury.186 Of
course, interspousal immunity does not prevail in all community prop-
erty states, 87 and in some the injured spouse's cause of action is treated
as separate property. 88 It would be perverse to suggest that the injury
resulted from the joint effort of the spouses or that the community
regime restores the ancient fiction of unitas personarum. Yet, unless
the community property statute can be interpreted to allow the right
of action as separate property, the domicile probably cannot give
preference to the law of the place of injury. While the policy of such
a statute restricts policies of compensation, its basis is more compre-
hensive than the suspect justifications of the doctrine of interspousal
184 Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 97 F. 837 (8th Cir. 1899), aff'd, 181 U.S. 57
(1901).
185 The reduction of the wife's award to community property may present consti-
tutional difficulties. See H. MARSH, MARTAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 171-79
(1952).
186 Under the doctrine of comparative negligence a hybrid solution might be
reached in a suit by the wife against a third party. The damages recoverable might be
reduced by the percentage of loss occasioned by the husband's negligence. This would
prevent the community from being "enriched" by the husband's misconduct and at
the same time prevent the property regime from depriving the injured spouse of any
recovery and so giving a windfall to the defendant and his insurer.
187 Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); see Addison
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1953).
188 See Hancock, supra note 78, at 376 n.l and cases cited therein.
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immunity. The fact of community, rather than the demonstrably un-
certain basis for interspousal immunity, inhibits recovery in such cases.
Hence an exception must be made to the principle of alternative
reference: when the domiciliary forum cannot judicially establish
an exception to its community property regime, the principle is inap-
plicable, even in the case of an out-of-state injury. This exception
parallels the situation in which the forum of the domicile in a common
law state cannot judicially make an exception to an express statutory
policy of interspousal immunity.
CONCLUSION
An effort has been made to formulate a choice-of-law rule that
reflects the social and economic realities of the times. The rule
synthesizes two quite compatible modern policies: the nonimmunity
policy of a concerned domicile and the compensation policy of a con-
cerned place of injury. Where one or the other can be selected, the
result will be either (1) to dismiss a supposed conflict as false, as when
the place of injury has an immunity policy that is rendered irrelevant
because of its lack of interest in the given spouses, or (2) to resolve a
true conflict in favor of the policy with greater intrinsic merit, as when
a concerned domicile has an immunity policy.
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